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Despite the title, this is not a simple hit piece on the corruption that has threatened financial meltdown for our country twice over the last decade. It is a well-written history of how financial schemes invented in the early 1990’s were systematically used by some of the most trusted corporations and individuals in American finance who discarded the interests of their customers in the pursuit of pure profit. Frank Partnoy is in an excellent position to know the territory he describes: he has worked as an investment banker, derivatives broker, and corporate securities attorney. He now is a professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. This book is about complex investments, such as derivatives and swaps, that are difficult to track even for the most sophisticated investors. Many large companies that were not known as investment firms, such as GMAC, risked a considerable amount of their funds in questionable investments, which put the money of their shareholders at risk in areas unrelated to their main business. Such investments were given high marks by rating firms who probably also didn’t understand them due to their complexity. Most avoided government scrutiny because they were dealing with new products not previously recognized. They were more like bets on inane details of the markets similar to super bowl bets that have little to do with the actual score. There were (and are) huge profits to be made by those who design esoteric investment schemes that fall out of the range of conventionally recognized investments, like stocks. Derivatives deal in areas such as the small moves in exchange rates between foreign currencies, or small differences between short-term and long-term interest rates. After the Fed raised interest rates from 3 to 3.25 percent in early 1994, there was “panic” among many firms on Wall Street, and Orange County was forced to declare bankruptcy after a $1.7B loss. Many firms – such as BA, First Boston, Merrill Lynch Paine Webber, and General Electric - who invested in derivatives based on the Mexican Peso staying low were forced to prop up even their money market funds, which were advertised as secure. Malfeasance went unpunished because those who would know enough to sponsor new regulations moved between positions as government regulators and Wall Street executives. The same executives risked their firms for short-term profits, which resulted in bonuses and stock option bonanzas for themselves. This book was actually written before the 2007-8 real-estate based financial meltdown, but similar short-term greed by mortgage companies and banks have contributed to our current fiasco.